ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGIONAL TAX INCENTIVES: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH by Alexandre Porsse et al.
Economic effects of regional tax incentives: a general equilibrium approach 
 
Alexandre Porsse 
Fundação de Economia e Estatística – RS e PPGE/UFRGS 
 
Eduardo Haddad 






Resumo: Governos regionais recorrentemente utilizam políticas de incentivos fiscais para 
influenciar as decisões privadas de alocação de investimentos visando atraí-los para dentro 
de suas jurisdições. Esse comportamento não é diferente no Brasil e parece ter sido 
catalisado nos últimos anos por uma conjugação de fatores. O objetivo deste artigo é 
demonstrar que a abordagem de equilíbrio geral computável pode ser uma solução 
metodológica apropriada para analisar os efeitos econômicos de políticas de incentivo 
fiscal para atração de novos investimentos. A proposta consiste em utilizar um modelo 
inter-regional de equilíbrio geral computável desenvolvido para duas regiões do Brasil, Rio 
Grande do Sul e Restante do Brasil, e simular os efeitos econômicos de um aumento no 
estoque de capital corrente da indústria de transformação do Rio Grande do Sul fomentado 
por renúncia tributária do governo regional e gastos públicos em investimento. 
 
 
Abstract: Tax incentives are common instruments in regional policies used to attract new 
investments and promote increase in employment and income, but the impact on regional 
public finances is very controversial. This paper uses an interregional computable general 
equilibrium model for the Brazilian economy to evaluate the net effects of tax incentives 
on the regional government revenues. The model takes into account the structural 
relationships between two regions and the specific characteristics of the Brazilian 
federalism that affects regional public finances. The theoretical specification allows 
capturing indirect and induced effects of the new investments and the net output of such 
incentive policies for the regional government revenues. 
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Regional governments often adopt tax incentive programs to attract private investments to 
their jurisdictions. This behavior is not different in Brazil, where such incentive policies 
have been growing in the last few years by a combination of factors. The inducement role 
of the federal government remarkably subsided during the 1990s in the context of the 
stabilization policies carried out in the country. This federal government’s behavior 
resulted in the lack of a national agenda for industrial policy and regional development for 
Brazil and opened the way for an active regional development policy by the local and state 
governments. The improvement in Brazil’s competitiveness after a technological upgrade 
due to the trade liberalization, the stability engendered by the Real Plan and the 
expansionary cycle of foreign capital investments in the second half of the 1990s, 
especially in the automobile industry, led Brazilian state governments to engage in a true 
fiscal war in order to influence the private decisions surrounding the spatial allocation of 
new investments. 
 
Tax incentive programs are mainly fueled by the expectations of welfare gains by means of 
an increase in the region’s level of employment and income, but the controversy 
surrounding its efficiency is far from being cleared up due to the difficulty in determining 
the effects on the economic system as a whole. On the one hand, supporters highlight the 
positive impacts on the creation of jobs and income whereas, on the other hand, opponents 
confine attention to the possible costs arising from the loss of tax revenue and, 
consequently, inefficient allocation of public goods.
1 
 
A consistent analysis of the effects of tax incentives for attraction of investments should 
not solely consider the aspects related to the creation of jobs and income, in an isolated 
fashion, in contrast with the necessary supply of public goods for the population, but also 
the specific characteristics of the environment in which this competition takes place. An 
important aspect is concerned with the context in which this “dispute” occurs, that is, the 
regional dimension and asymmetries can be a relevant factor, since the regional production 
specialization and the interregional trade patterns can determine a regional interdependence 
that affects the allocation of investments. The government’s vertical relationships are also 
important, mainly when the federal system uses mechanisms for the transfer of tax 
revenues to regional governments,
2 as is the case of Brazil. 
 
However, an important issue is the type of investment targeted by the tax incentive 
program. In the real world, incentive programs can be used to attract new investments 
when they do not seek to influence, at least not directly, the allocation of investments 
already made and distributed across regions.
3 This situation involves granting of specific 
                                                 
1 The available literature on interjurisdictional competition has not yet reached a common agreement on the 
implications related to the efficiency of allocation of public goods. Some studies suggest that this type of 
competition results in suboptimal allocation of public goods, whereas others consider allocation to be 
efficient when the federal government keeps tabs on competition. For a literature review see Kenyon (1997) 
and Wilson and Wildasin (2004). 
2 In this case, the region that grants tax benefits may have an increase in its revenues due to the transfers of 
revenues since undertaken investments tend to produce a positive effect on the collection of federal taxes. 
3 In a context of capital and labor mobility, we cannot rule out the possibility of indirect effects of tax 
incentives on the spatial distribution of investments.   3
incentive packages negotiated at the firm level (e.g.: large investments intended for the 
installation of a new production plant), strongly resembling the behavior of regional 
governments regarding the competition for the allocation of investments by automobile 
industries. Nevertheless, regional governments can also implement permanent incentive 
programs that can either be used to encourage new investments or to influence the regional 
reallocation of investments. The latter case may be perverse because it implies direct 
competition for the existing capital stock and its application in a context of strategic 
interactions between regions can lead to a zero-sum game and to inefficient allocation of 
public goods. 
 
This study focuses on the first type of tax incentives, whose aim is to attract new 
investments by offering tax relief. The objective is to show that the computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) approach can be an appropriate method for assessing the economic 
effects of tax incentives to attract new investments in a given region. Our proposal consists 
in using an interregional computable general equilibrium (ICGE) model developed for two 
Brazilian regions (State of Rio Grande do Sul and Rest of Brazil) and simulating the 
economic effects of an increase in the capital stock of manufacturing industries in Rio 
Grande do Sul which is fully granted by the regional government, that is, by the tax 
revenue already collected. We pay attention to the effects on GDP, employment and the 
change in tax revenue collection induced by the new investments. The theoretical 
framework of this model is based on the B-MARIA model (Haddad, 1999) and its 
advantage is the integration between an interregional economic database and a public 
finance module for regional and federal governments that take into account the structural 
characteristics of Brazilian fiscal federalism. 
 
The B-MARIA-RS model 
 
B-MARIA-RS (Brazilian Multisectoral and Regional/Interregional Analysis – Rio Grande 
do Sul) is an interregional computable general equilibrium model developed for the 
analysis of the economy of Rio Grande do Sul and of Brazil. Its theoretical framework is 




The B-MARIA-RS model divides the Brazilian economy into two regions, Rio Grande do 
Sul and Rest of Brazil, and identifies a single foreign market (Rest of the World). The 
calibration data are those for 1998, and 25 productive sectors and investment goods are 
specified for each region. The productive sectors use two local primary factors (capital and 
labor). The final demand consists of household consumption, investment, exports, and 
regional and federal government consumption. The regional governments are sources of 
exclusively local demands and expenditure, comprising the state and municipal levels of 
public administration in each region. The whole model contains 60,323 equations and 
1,475 exogenous variables.
5 
                                                 
4 Following this tradition, the models use the Johansen approach, where the mathematical framework is 
represented by a set of linearized equations and the solutions are obtained as growth rates. In the Brazilian 
economy, the PAPA (Guilhoto, 1995), EFES (Haddad e Domingues, 2001) and EFES-IT (Haddad et al., 
2001; 2002) models, among others, use this approach. 
5 The full description of the model is available in Porsse (2005). A miniature version for tests and evaluation 
is available from the authors upon request. This miniature model can be implemented in the demo version of 
the GEMPACK program (www.monash.edu.au/policy/gpdemo.htm).   4
 
The main innovation in the B-MARIA-RS model is the detailed treatment of public 
finances. As will be described ahead, this modification consists of the introduction of 
alternative closures for the governments regarding public finance policies.  
 
The core module of the model comprises blocks of equations that determine the 
relationship between supply and demand, derived from optimization theories, and market 
equilibrium conditions. The indirect taxes at the core of the model are decomposed in order 
to separate the state indirect tax from the other federal and municipal indirect taxes. In 
addition, several regional and national aggregates are defined, such as level of aggregate 
employment, balance of trade and price indices. Next, we present the main theoretical 




Figure 1 illustrates the production technology encountered in the B-MARIA-RS model, a 
usual specification in regional models. This specification defines three levels of 
optimization for the productive process of firms. The dashed lines indicate the functional 
forms specified in each stage. Fixed proportion combinations of intermediate inputs and 
primary factors are assumed at the first level, through the Leontief specification. The 
second level involves substitution between domestically produced and imported inputs on 
one side, and substitution between capital and labor on the other side. A constant elasticity 
substitution (CES) function is used for the combination of inputs and primary factors. At 
the third level, bundles of domestically produced and imported intermediate inputs are 
formed as combinations of inputs from different sources. Again, a CES function is used to 
combine goods from different sources.  
 
The use of CES functions in the production technology implies the adoption of the so-
called Armington assumption (Armington, 1969) for product differentiation. This 
hypothesis regards goods from different sources as imperfect substitutes. For instance, 
agricultural and livestock products from Rio Grande do Sul are different from the 
agricultural and livestock products from the Rest of Brazil with regard to their use in the 
productive process (third level in Figure 1). This treatment permits the model to exhibit 




                                                 
6 For product differentiation in the world market and CGE models, see De Melo and Robinson (1989). The 
behavior of several classes of CES functions is analyzed in Perroni and Rutherford (1995).   5





















Each region has a group of representative households, which buy domestic goods (either 
locally produced or from other regions) and imported goods. The specification of 
household demand, in each region, is based on a CES/linear expenditure system (LES) 
preference function. The demand equations are derived from a utility maximization 
problem, whose solution follows hierarchical steps, similar to the ones shown in Figure 1. 
At the bottom level, substitution occurs across different domestic and imported sources of 
supply. At the subsequent upper level, substitution occurs between domestic composite and 
imported goods. The utility derived from the consumption of domestic and imported 
composite goods is maximized according to a Stone-Geary utility function. This 
specification gives rise to the linear expenditure system (LES), in which the expenditure 
share above the subsistence level for each good represents a constant proportion of the total 
subsistence expenditure of each regional household.
7  
 
Demand for Investment Goods 
Investors are a category of use of final demand, and are held responsible for capital 
formation in each regional sector. They choose the inputs used in the capital formation 
process through cost minimization using a hierarchically structured technology. 
                                                 
7 For the parameters necessary for the calibration of this specification, see Dixon et al. (1982). The LES 
specification is non-homothetic, such that the increase in the household expenditure (income) causes changes 
in the share of goods in overall expenditure, ceteris paribus.   6
 
This technology is similar to the production technology, with some adaptations. As occurs 
with the production technology, the capital good is produced by domestic and imported 
inputs. At the third level, an aggregate bundle of intermediate goods (domestic and 
imported) is formed as the combination of inputs from different sources. A CES function is 
used in the combination of goods from different sources. Differently from the production 
technology, primary factors are not used directly as input for capital formation, but used 
indirectly through inputs in sectoral production, especially in the civil construction sector. 
The level of regional investment in capital goods per sector is determined by the capital 
accumulation block. 
 
Export and Government Demand 
 
All export goods have downward sloping demand curves for their own prices in the world 
market. A vector of elasticity defines the response of foreign demand to changes in the 
FOB price of regional exports.  
 
The government demand for public goods is based on the isolation of the consumption of 
public goods by the regional and federal governments, obtained from the input-output 
matrix. However, productive activities carried out by the public sector cannot be 
dissociated from those performed by the private sector. Thus, the government’s 
entrepreneurial behavior is dictated by the same cost minimization assumptions adopted by 
the private sector. This hypothesis may be considered more appropriate, at first, for the 
Brazilian economy, since the privatization process implemented in the 1990s substantially 
reduced the participation of the government in the productive sector (Haddad, 1999). 
Public goods consumption is set to maintain a constant proportion with 1) regional private 
consumption, in the case of regional governments, and 2) with national private 
consumption, in the case of the federal government.   
 
Capital Accumulation and Investment 
 
Capital stock and investment relationships are defined in this module. There are two 
comparative static versions for the model that allow its use in short-run and long-run 
simulations. The use of the comparative statics model implies no fixed relationship 
between capital and investment; this relationship is selected on the basis of the 
requirements of the specific simulation. For example, in typical long-run comparative 
static simulations, growth of investment and capital is assumed to be identical (see Peter et 
al., 1996). 
 
Some qualifications are necessary for the specification of capital formation and investment 
in the model. As discussed in Dixon et al. (1982), the modeling of these components is 
basically concerned with how investment expenditures are allocated both per sector and 
per region, and not with the aggregate private investment in construction, machinery and 
equipment. On top of that, the temporal conception of investment used is not endowed with 
a correlation with a precise timetable; this would be a necessary characteristic if the model 
had the aim to explain the investment expansion path over time. Therefore, the main   7
concern regarding the investment modeling is to capture the effects of the shocks  on the 
allocation of current investment expenditure across sectors and regions. 
Labor Market and Regional Migration 
 
In this module, the population in each region is defined exogenously through the 
interaction of demographic variables and interregional migration variables, and there is 
also a connection between regional population and labor supply. Given the specification of 
the labor market functioning, labor supply can be determined by interregional wage 
differentials or by regional unemployment rates, along with demographic variables, often 
defined exogenously. In summary, both labor supply and wage differentials may determine 
unemployment rates or, alternatively, labor supply and unemployment rates will determine 
wage differentials.  
Other Specifications 
 
The government finance module incorporates equations determining the gross regional 
product for each region, through the decomposition and modeling of its components, on 
both the expenditure and income sides. Budget constraints of the regional and federal 
governments are also defined
8, as well as the aggregate household consumption functions 
in each region (disaggregated into the main sources of income and in the respective tax 
duties). Other definitions in the model include tax rates, basic prices, and purchase prices 
of commodities, tax revenues, margins, components of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
and gross regional product (GRP), regional and national price indices, factor prices, 




The B-MARIA-RS model can be used for short-run and long-run comparative static 
simulations. The basic distinction between these two types of closure lies in the treatment 
given to the microeconomic approach to capital stock adjustment. Capital stocks are held 




In the short-run closure, besides the hypothesis of interindustry and interregional 
immobility of capital, the regional population and labor supply are fixed, the regional wage 
differentials are constant and the national real wage is fixed. Regional employment is 
driven by the assumptions on wage rates, which indirectly determine regional 
unemployment rates. On the demand side, investment expenditures are exogenous  – firms 
cannot reassess investment decisions in the short run. Household consumption follows 
household disposable income, and government consumption, at both regional and federal 
levels, is fixed (alternatively, government deficit can be set exogenously, allowing 
government expenditures to change). Finally, the technology variables are exogenous, 
given that the model does not present any endogenous growth theory.  
 
                                                 
8 See next section. 
9 For closures in CGE models, see Dixon and Parmenter (1996) e Dixon et al. (1982).   8
In the long-run closure, capital and labor are mobile across sectors and regions. The major 
differences from the short-run closure lie in the configuration of the labor market and 
capital accumulation. In the former case, aggregate employment is determined by 
population growth, labor force participation rates, and the natural rate of unemployment. 
The distribution of labor force across regions and sectors is totally determined 
endogenously. Labor is attracted to more competitive sectors in more favored geographical 
areas. Likewise, capital is directed towards more attractive sectors. This movement keeps 




The simulation design is based on the observation of several tax incentive packages 
established by Brazilian state governments in the mid-1990s in order to attract new 
investments in the automobile sector to their jurisdictions.
10 These incentives consisted of 
tax exemption, mainly from the value-added tax on sales and services (ICMS
11), direct 
infrastructure expenditures, provision of plots of land and direct financing in the form of 
subsidized credit for fixed capital and shareholder in some cases. 
 
The simulation strategy encompasses two aspects. First, it considers that the values of new 
investments are totally paid by the regional (state) government’s indirect tax revenue, that 
is, it is assumed that the total value of new investments is deducted from the collection of 
ICMS, the major state indirect tax. This is equivalent to a tax exemption policy that fully 
covers the private expenditures with the capital stock expansion of the regional firms
12. 
Secondly, it considers that the regional government’s public expenditures with investment 
goods are endogenous and follow the growth of private investments. This allows capturing 
the effects of public investments in infrastructure needful to support the private 
investments.  
 
To apply this strategy we use a similar procedure applied in Haddad and Hewings (1999). 
It is assumed that the effects of new investments can be assessed under the hypothesis of 
technological upgrade of industries. Specifically, a 1% shock is attributed to the current 
capital stock of manufacturing industries of Rio Grande do Sul. To include the tax relief in 
the simulation, the monetary value
13 corresponding to the shock in the current capital stock 
is deducted from the tax revenue collected through indirect taxes charged by Rio Grande 
do Sul’s governments. The simulation is performed under a long-run closure and, 
therefore, it admits interregional and intersectoral mobility of capital and labor. 
 
                                                 
10 Prado and Cavalcanti (2000) conducted an excellent review of state incentive programs implemented 
during this period. 
11 The ICMS is an excise tax and is collected like a value added tax by Brazilian state governments. 
Considering the revenues from all indirect taxes collected by Rio Grande do Sul’s governments (state and 
municipalities), ICMS accounts for 91.7% of the total, according to the database calibrated for the B-
MARIA-RS model. 
12 The Rio Grande do Sul state government actually have a tax incentive program to attract business 
investments that covers until 100% of the fixed capital augmenting by the firms through ICMS exemption. 
This program is denominated FUNDOPEM and applies the following rules: a 4% annual nominal interest 
rate, until six years to start the loan payments and until eight years to amortize the each monthly debt quote. 
Taking into account the depreciation rate and the real interest rate, in some cases the tax exemptions fully 
covers the private investments and thus our hypothesis is not unrealistic. 
13 This value is deflated by the GDP deflator.   9
The government’s closure plays a key role in this simulation. In the B-MARIA-RS model, 
government’s revenues and expenditures are itemized and sorted out according to the level 
of regional government, including state, municipal and federal government. The federal 
government has vertical relationships with regional governments through current transfers 
and capital transfers.
14 Most of the public expenditure components are determined 
endogenously by aggregate variables of the macroeconomic, demographic and labor 
market modules. For instance, public investments follow the variation in private 
investments in order to accommodate the needs of infrastructure investments, personal  
benefit payments evolve positively with labor supply and population growth and 
negatively with the employment variation, the subsidies follow the performance of indirect 
tax revenue, payment of interests are contingent upon the GDP variation. Despite its 
endogenous determination, this mechanism implies that the government spending policy is 
exogenous – the governments should meet the demand for public goods – and that the 
pressures on such expenditures should be accommodated by tax revenue increases. 
 
The tax revenue can grow if there is a positive effect of the new investments on the tax 
base, or due to changes in tax rates, or both. Then we allow the federal government to 
respond to public goods pressures by endogenously adjusting the income tax rate if the 
income tax base effect is not so high. For the regional governments we assume an 
endogenous adjustment in payroll tax rates. But it is worth noting the effects on federal 
income and indirect tax revenues that also have effects on regional government revenues 
due to the fiscal transfer mechanism. Table 1 summarizes the government’s closure 
regarding the degree of freedom to implement public finance policies in the government 
view. 
 
                                                 
14 The federal government collects income tax and indirect taxes on industrialized products and 
approximately one quarter of this revenue is transferred from the federal government to regional 
governments.   10
Table 1 – Government’s closure for the public finance policy  
Components of public finances  Regional Govt.   Federal Govt. 
Government’s revenue  Mixed Mixed 
   Direct taxes  Exogenous Mixed 
Income taxes  - Endogenous 
Other direct taxes  Exogenous Exogenous 
   Indirect taxes  Mixed Exogenous 
Tariff revenue  Exogenous Exogenous 
Commodity taxes  Exogenous Exogenous 
Payroll taxes  Endogenous Exogenous 
Property taxes  Exogenous - 
Land taxes  - - 
Other indirect taxes  Exogenous Exogenous 
   Interests received   Exogenous Exogenous 
   Federal transfers  Exogenous Exogenous 
   Other revenues  Exogenous Exogenous 
   Discrepancy  Exogenous Exogenous 
    
Public deficit  Exogenous Exogenous 
    
Government’s expenditure Exogenous  Exogenous 
Expenditures on goods and services Exogenous  Exogenous 
   Government consumption Exogenous  Exogenous 
   Government investment  Exogenous  Exogenous 
Personal benefit payments Exogenous  Exogenous 
Subsidies Exogenous  Exogenous 
Interest payments  Exogenous  Exogenous 
Federal transfers to regions Exogenous  Exogenous 





The simulation was implemented using Euler’s method to correct linearization errors and 
the results are reported in percentage change rates, except for the equivalent variation. 
Table 2 summarizes the main effects of the increase in current capital stock in the 
manufacturing industry of Rio Grande do Sul for some regional and national variables. The 
GDP components were deflated by their respective price indices. By observing the results 
for Rio Grande do Sul, the increase in demand generated by new investments produces 
positive effects on employment and on equivalent variation, indicating that it is necessary 
to increase the number of employed individuals to guarantee the productive growth of 
manufacturing sectors and that the representative household of the model has a superior 
level of utility. The welfare effect is strengthened by the decrease in the price of final 
consumer goods and by the increase in the household disposable income due to the positive 
impact on primary factors income. 
   11
Table 2 – Long-run percentage effects: 1% increase in current capital of 
manufacturing industry of Rio Grande do Sul 
Variables  Rio Grande do Sul Rest of Brazil  Brazil 
GDP components      
Real household consumption  0.630 0.031  0.073
Real aggregate investment  4.355 -0.012  0.273
Real aggregate regional government demand  - -  -
Real aggregate federal government demand  - -  -
Interregional export volume   -1.331 1.184  -
International export volume   -2.488 -1.006  -1.151
Interregional import volume  1.184 -1.331  -
International  import volume  0.737 0.341  0.362
      
Prices      
Consumer price index  -0.071 0.457  0.419
Investment price index  1.558 0.445  0.519
Regional government price index  0.485 0.537  0.534
Federal government price index  0.485 0.537  0.535
Interregional export price index  2.070 0.435  -
International export price index  1.709 0.418  0.544
Interregional import price index  0.435 2.070  -
International import price index  - -  -
GDP deflator (expenditure side)  1.117 0.463  0.513
      
Primary factors      
Aggregate payments to capital  4.506 0.428  0.727
Aggregate payments to labor  0.543 0.481  0.486
Aggregate capital stock  2.712 -0.018  0.184
      
Welfare indicators      
Equivalent variation
* 1,305 1,281  2,585
Real GDP  -0.219 -0.005  -0.021
Employment 0.118 -0.008  0.001
Source: calculated by the authors. 
Note: * values in R$ million. 
 
Nevertheless, the effect on real GDP is negative because of the sharp increase in the 
general price level (GDP deflator) caused by the demand shock. As Rio Grande do Sul’s 
economy is highly specialized in the production of final consumer goods, especially in the 
agroindustrial sectors, but poorly specialized in the production of investment goods and of 
some basic inputs, the shock tends to produce remarkable increase in the prices of these 
goods. Price increases affect mainly the competitive position of goods traded in the 
interregional and foreign markets, resulting in a substitution effect that exceeds the gains 
induced by the real increase in investments and in household consumption. The benefits of 
the incentive program are absorbed by investors and households, whereas the costs are 
absorbed by interregional and international export agents. 
 
The effects on GDP and employment in the Rest of Brazil are negative and relatively 
small. Although this region has a competitive advantage in the interregional market, 
regional mobility of production factors exerts pressure on the cost of production and on the 
general price level of goods in the region. Interregional relationships concentrate the 
absorption of price increases in this region. Thus, the reduction in GDP is contingent on   12
the real reduction in investments and on the loss of competitiveness in the foreign market, 
which also produces a substitution effect between domestically produced and imported 
goods. Quite surprisingly, real household consumption and equivalent variation show a 
positive variation in the Rest of Brazil. In this case, the effect results from a nominal 
increase in the primary factors income, especially labor, higher than the increase in the 
prices of household consumer goods. 
 
The aggregate effects in both regions determine positive results for the Brazilian economy 
in terms of job creation and higher level of utility for households, but the negative effect on 
GDP persists. Considering Brazil as a whole, it is clear that the gains from the tax incentive 
program for attraction of investments to the manufacturing industry of Rio Grande do Sul 
tend to benefit investors and consumers, whereas the costs related to the increase in the 
domestic price level determine a substitution between domestically produced and imported 
goods which have a negative effect on the balance of trade. 
 
Now we can look at the implications for public finances of the governments. Table 3 
shows the effects on tax revenue, expenditures and public deficit of the regional and 
federal governments in real growth rates obtained from the difference between nominal 
variations and the GDP deflator. It should be highlighted that the change in indirect taxes 
revenue of Rio Grande do Sul is already adjusted, that is, it represents the net revenue after 
deduction of the monetary values of the shocks in the current capital stock. 
 
The increase in the level of investment in the manufacturing sectors of Rio Grande do Sul 
increases the demand for investments by the government of Rio Grande do Sul and by the 
federal government, placing some pressure on their expenditures. For the federal 
government, the shock of investment in Rio Grande do Sul has a low impact on the tax 
base associated with the collection of indirect taxes and there is a real negative effect on 
tax collection because the nominal variation is lower than changes in the general price 
level. Considering the effects on the production factors income, the impact on the income 
tax base is also low. Therefore, the federal government’s investments are financed through 
a relatively high increase in the income tax rate since part of this revenue is transferred to 
regional governments in compliance with constitutional rules.
15 So, the adjustment of 
federal government on the revenue side tends to benefit the revenue of regional 
governments. 
 
                                                 
15 In the implemented simulation, the income tax rate had a 4.86% endogenous increase.   13
Table 3 – Long-run percentage effects on public finances: 1% increase in 
current capital of the manufacturing industry of Rio Grande do Sul 
Governments 
Variables 
Rio Grande do Sul  Rest of Brazil  Federal 
Government’s revenue 0.002  0.057  0.105 
Tax revenue  0.293  0.106  0.820 
   Direct taxes  -0.222  -0.005  3.692 
Income taxes  -  -  5.033 
Other direct taxes  -0.222  -0.005  -0.022 
   Indirect taxes  0.691  -0.096  -0.030 
Tariff revenue  -  -  -0.136 
Commodity taxes  1.091  -0.042  -0.021 
Payroll taxes  -2.618  -1.348  -0.022 
Property taxes  -0.222  -0.005  - 
Land taxes  -  -  - 
Other indirect taxes  -0.222  -0.005  -0.022 
   Interests received  -0.222  -0.005  -0.022 
   Federal transfers  2.896  3.550  - 
   Other revenues  -0.222  -0.005  -0.022 
Discrepancy -0.633  0.074  0.021 
      
Public deficit  -  -  - 
      
Government’s expenditure 0.002  0.057  0.105 
Expenditures on goods and services   0.006  0.061  0.156 
   Government consumption  -0.633  0.074  0.021 
   Government investment  4.864  -0.030  1.825 
Personal benefit payments  -0.579  -0.052  -0.089 
Subsidies 0.957  -0.044  0.043 
Interest payments  -0.222  -0.005  -0.022 
Federal transfers to regions  -  -  3.500 
Other outlays  0.002  0.057  0.105 
 
The pressures on public investments are more remarkable for the regional government of 
Rio Grande do Sul and are financed by the increase in the indirect taxes revenue 
(exclusively due the tax base growth) and by the increase in revenues from federal 
transfers. Two aspects related to the effects on the tax base of Rio Grande do Sul should be 
noted: first, as the regional government comprises the state and its municipalities, the tax 
base growth extends to the indirect tax collection of municipal governments; secondly, 
even though the international export sector absorbs a significant amount of the price 
increase, the decrease in the volume of international exports does not substantially affect 
the collection of indirect taxes at the state government level because the Kandir Law 
exempted exporters from paying the ICMS.
16 
 
The reallocation effect on the economy of the Rest of Brazil, especially regarding capital, 
contributes to a reduction of the region’s real tax base, but on the other hand, it originates 
less demand for public investments. Even so, the government’s revenue in this region 
benefits from the increase in federal transfers, and this allows elevating the provision of 
public goods or creating new expenses. If, on the one hand, the region loses in terms of job 
                                                 
16 The Kandir Law came into force in 1997 and the base year for the  B-MARIA-RS model is 1998.   14
creation and GDP, on the other hand, it can have public revenue gains due to vertical 
governmental relationships. 
 
Two final remarks are also necessary. The combined effect of a tax base growth in Rio 
Grande do Sul and the increases in regional government revenues established by vertical 
governmental relationships allow for a reduction in payroll tax rates. The high negative 
effects on the collection of payroll taxes from regional governments, albeit influenced by a 
general price increase, also result from an endogenous reduction in tax rates caused by the 
increase in the indirect tax revenue (only for Rio Grande do Sul) and in the transfer 
revenues. Finally, on the expenditure side, the real variations in government consumption 
arise from the relative effect between the price of these goods and the GDP deflator. 
 
 
Decomposition of results 
 
In the previous section, we could observe that the increase in current capital stock in the 
manufacturing industry of Rio Grande do Sul in a context of a tax incentive program 
causes demand pressures that result in a general price increase that produces negative 
effects on real GDP all over the country and, more significantly, in Rio Grande do Sul. 
This section explores the sources of this effect by the sectoral decomposition of those 
sectoral shocks. To do that, each sectoral shock was simulated separately assuming that the 
investments in other sectors of the manufacturing industry of Rio Grande do Sul remain 
constant.
17 The results for both regions are described in Graphs 1 and 2. 
 
We can clearly see that the increase in the implicit GDP deflator is a general effect, both at 
the sectoral and interregional levels, resulting from the increase in the capital stock of the 
manufacturing industry of Rio Grande do Sul, which varies in intensity. However, the 
effects of the increase in the deflator and of the reduction in real GDP are influenced by the 
resulting growth of investments in the chemical and petrochemical sector of Rio Grande do 
Sul. In the absence of shock in this sector, the results would be influenced by the activity 
effect and there would be a positive impact on real GDP, at least in the Rio Grande do 
Sul.
18 
                                                 
17 In the B-MARIA-RS model, manufacturing industry is stratified into 14 sectors: metallurgy (2), machinery 
and tractors (3), electrical and electronic equipment (4), transportation material (5), wood products and 
furniture (6), paper and printing (7), chemical and petrochemical products (8), leather and footwear (9), 
processed vegetables (10), meat products (11), dairy products (12), vegetable oils (13), other food industries 
(14), and other industries (15). 
18 The simulation was implemented in the same context, only leaving out the chemical and petrochemical 
sector, and the results showed a variation of 0.125% and –0.014%, respectively, for the real GDP of Rio 
Grande do Sul and of the Rest of Brazil.   15
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In Rio Grande do Sul, the chemical and petrochemical sector is the one with the largest 
demand for investment goods among other sectors (26.1%) and with strong domestic 
sectoral and interregional relationships. The growth of current capital stock in this sector 
exerts a strong pressure on the prices of investment goods, increases the cost of capital in 
the sector and also the cost of production. Since the goods produced by the chemical and 
petrochemical sector feed the chain of intermediate inputs in several economic sectors of 
Rio Grande do Sul and also in the Rest of Brazil, price increases are passed along. The 
final result is a more remarkable price increase in Rio Grande do Sul compared to the Rest 
of Brazil. In such a way the interregional substitution effects prevail over the activity effect 
causing a decrease in the real GDP of Rio Grande do Sul and an increase in GDP of the 





This paper used a general equilibrium approach to evaluate the effects of a regional tax 
incentive program for attraction of investments. The analysis focused mainly on the 
financing of new private investments through tax revenue relief and public investment 
expenditures by regional and federal government. The interregional general equilibrium 
model used to run the simulations captures the effects of regional interdependence and of 
vertical relationships between the governments. 
 
The results showed that the effects on employment and household welfare of consumers 
are positive for the region that implements such incentive policy, the Stete of Rio Grande 
do Sul. However, the effect on real GDP may not follow the same path and this would 
occur mainly because of the specialized pattern of production in the region. As shown, the 
specificity of the productive structure of Rio Grande do Sul plays an important role. The 
absence of a consolidated investment goods sector and the demand for these goods 
concentrated in  sectors that produce basic inputs caused a sharp increase in the production 
factor prices. The increase in the input prices extended for goods produced by other sectors 
and in the regional production chains, due to forward linkages. This sector’s specific effect 
dominates the positive impacts on the real GDP of Rio Grande do Sul when the shocks are 
implemented in the other manufacturing sectors. At the aggregate level, the advantages of 
this incentive policy tend to benefit investors and consumers, while costs are absorbed by 
export agents. Surprisingly, although the effects of interregional competition prevail over 
the Rest of Brazil due to the re-location of production factors, the intensity is relatively 
smaller and does not seem to affect the consumers’ utility level. In this region, the effects 
wind up absorbed by foreign investors and exporters. 
 
Another interesting result concerns the effects on the public finances of regional and 
federal governments. The net result on the indirect tax revenue is positive due to the 
increase in the tax base, even considering the tax revenue relief offered by the regional 
government to thoroughly finance the increase in private investments. A key role may be 
ascribed to the federal government’s tax policy. If the federal government increases the 
income tax rates in order to meet the demand for federal public investments, regional 
governments are benefited through income transfer mechanisms. The transfers received by 
the Rest of Brazil government exceed the loss that arises from relocation of the tax base. 
Additionally, the impact of the increase in federal income tax rate on the disposable   17
income is not negative due to the relatively higher gains produced on the primary factors 
income and other earnings. 
 
These results show that the general equilibrium approach is a useful framework for 
investigation of the economic effects produced by tax incentive programs that seek to 
attract business investments. This methodology permits analyzing the welfare effects of 
such policies using a consistent model that captures important second order effects. The 
focus of the present study was on a situation in which only one region uses a tax incentive 
program to attract new investments and the federal government adjusts its tax policy 
according to the high demands for public investments. Since regional asymmetries and the 
pattern of interregional linkages may play a crucial role on the welfare effects, we may 
think of an alternative environment where both regions adopt tax incentive programs to 
attract new investments. Investigation of the sensitivity of the results to different closures 
for the federal government tax policy also appears to be relevant. Finally, this approach can 
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